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IN TIIE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
i 
I 
PLATEAU URANIUM INVESTMENT I 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SUGAR AND ULMER, a partnership, 
and PAUL SUGAR and HARRY UL-
MER 
' Defendants and Appellants. )
> Ca~;7~o. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent does not agree with the Statement of Facts 
submitted by Appellants. The statement is incomplete and not 
objective. However, since the argument of Point One requires 
a complete review of the evidence, no attempt will be made 
by the Respondent to state the particular points of disagreement. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE: THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE FINDINGS OF THE 
COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE APPELLANTS 
AGREED TO PAY A RETAINER OF $500, PLUS COSTS. 
POINT TWO: THE OBLIGATION OF THE APPEL-
LANTS WAS NOT DISCHARGED BY VIRTUE OF TITLE 
15-4, U.C.A. 1953. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE FINDINGS OF THE 
COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE APPELLANTS 
AGREED TO PAY A RETAINER OF $500, PLUS COSTS. 
Finding of Fact Number 2, which the Appellant claims is 
not supported by the evidence, is as follows: 
"On April 12, 1955, the defendants (Appellants) 
agreed to pay the plaintiff's assignor (Respondent) the 
sum of $500 and costs on a fee to be charged for services 
performed in connection with the organizing of Deseret 
Uranium Corporation and clearance with State and 
Federal regulatory bodies, for the purpose of permit-
ting a public sale of stock of said company." 
The only factual issue for the court to decide was whether 
there was or was not an agreement as found in the Findings 
of Fact. The trial took less than two hours and involved the 
testimony of three witnesses. It is submitted that the evidence 
is not only sufficient to sustain the Findings of Fact, but rather 
compels such a finding. 
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Although the parties disagree as to whether the Appellants 
were personally liable on the first fee arrangement, there is 
no dispute but what Mr. Bushnell performed all of the legal 
work originally agreed upon and was not paid. After that 
time, he was again requested to prepare a new offering circular 
and to make new filings with State and Federal regulatory 
bodies for the purpose of securing authorization to commence 
a public sale of stock. Discussions concerning the first fee 
arrangement were had with Mr. Sugar. Although there was a 
preliminary discussion sometime prior to March 19, 1955, 
the final fee arrangement was consummated with Mr. Ulmer 
during the first part of April, 1955 (R. 16, 22). There is no 
dispute concerning the fact that the Appellants advanced $175 
to apply on costs in connection with the initial work (R. 8). 
There is also no dispute that if the underwriting had been 
successful the Appellaf!tS would have been the principal 
parties to benefit therefrom. They readily admitted that they 
would have received a substantial profit involving cash, royal-
ties and stock (R. 11, 12, 42). 
Mr. Bushnell testified in behalf of the Respondent to 
the effect that before agreeing to make the refilings a new fee 
arrangement was negotiated. More particularly, the Appellants 
agreed to pay all costs and advance a $500 retainer. A contin-
gent fee of $3,000 cash and $3,000 stock was to be paid by the 
corporation if the underwritings were successful. If the cor-
poration paid such a fee, Mr. Bushnell would then reimburse 
the Appellants for the sums advanced by them. Whether such 
an agreement was made was the sole factual issue for the trial 
court. The testimony of the Appellants is sufficient to support 
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a finding that such an agreement was made, without relying 
upon the direct testimony of Mr. Bushnell. 
Paul Sugar, one of the Appellants, called as an adverse 
witness, testified that he went to the hospital with a heart 
attack on March 19, 1955 (R. 45), and that Mr. Ulmer con-
tinued with the negotiations and arrangements for the refiling. 
He admitted that either while he was at the hospital or im-
mediately thereafter while convalescing, Mr. Ulmer had a 
discussion with him concerning a demand made by Mr. Bushnell 
for the $500 retainer plus costs (R. 46). It should be noted 
that it is the contention of Mr. Bushnell that the fee arrange-
ment was finally agreed upon on April 12, 1955; that the final 
papers and material were submitted to him in May of 1955; 
that the filing was made with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in June, and final approval was secured therefrom 
on July 8, 1955. Part of Mr. Sugar's testimony concerning the 
$500 retainer is as follows: 
" (Questions by Mr. Bushnell) 
Answer: Well, he also said that you said, at that time, 
that I would give him five-give you $500 towards this 
fee at that time; this I didn't tell you. 
Question: See if we understana what you are saying; 
Mr. Ulmer said to you that I was taking the position 
that Sugar and Ulmer was to pay me a $500 retainer-
Answer: Yes. 
Question: -is that correct? 
Answer: No; no, that you and I had made that ar-
rangement. 
Question: That is what he told you? 
Answer: That is correct." (R. 17). 
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Mr. Sugar admitted that he had testified as follows at the 
time of the taking of his deposition: 
"Answer: That came up later when Harry Ulmer told 
me you were asking for $500 as the advance retainer, 
and that was the first time I had heard of it. 
Question: When did Harry Ulmer advise you of that? 
Answer: I don't recall that with reference to the work 
being done, before or after it was done, or after the 
work had been started. Anyway, I don't know if it 
had been completed. 
Question: All right, what did he tell you about the 
$500? 
Answer: He said you were looking for $500 fee-a 
$500 advance on the fee, and you didn't want to go 
ahead, and I said, ·you tell him to go ahead and do 
that work.' " (R. 18). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Sugar testified concerning the 
same matter as follows: 
"Question: And you have testified, have you not, that 
Mr. Ulmer told you, either when you were in the hos-
pital or when you were convalescing, that I was making 
demand for $500 retainer before I would go ahead. 
Didn't he tell you that? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: And you testified that you told Mr. Ulmer to 
go ahead, did you not? 
Answer: Yes, because-but, in line with the same 
thing, I attempted before to make out exactly what I 
did say to go ahead, it being understood you knew 
what-." (R. 46). 
Although Mr. Sugar attempted to qualify the foregoing 
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statements, he had to admit that he had made no such attempted 
qualification at the time of the taking of his deposition. 
Although Mr. Ulmer admitted that he was not involved 
in any discussions regarding the initial fee arrangement and 
that he did participate actively with reference to the refiling 
with the second group of properties, (R. 20) he testified that 
he did know of a discussion concerning a $500 fee. His testi-
mony was as follows: 
"Answer: Well, now, I don't know whether Mr. Sugar 
told me, or I got that information from elsewhere, but, 
as I remember, the original fee was to be in the neigh-
borhood of $500. * * * (R. 22). 
Question: But you do recall discussions concerning the 
$500 fee-that that fee-
Answer: Not discussions; possibly, just mere state-
ments. 
Question: You do have in your recollection-
Answer: Yes. 
Question :-that there was, at some time, a fee of $500 
discussed. 
Answer: That's correct, yes. 
Question: And who was to pay that $500 fee, according 
to your understanding? 
Answer: As I remember, we were going to advance 
the money-Sugar and Ulmer. 
Question: Do I understand your testimony correctly 
that, as to the $500, it is your recollection that Sugar 
and Ulmer was to pay that amount? 
Answer: Yes." (R. 23). 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
L 
Mr. Bushnell testified that he made a demand upon Mr. 
Sugar and Mr. Ulmer for the $500 retainer in a telephone 
conversation in which he talked to both Mr. Sugar and Mr. 
Ulmer. He testified that the conversation in substance was as 
follows: 
"He (Sugar) said, 'Son, what is it you want?' I said, I 
want my $500 and costs.' He said, 'If that is all you 
are worried about, don't worry about it; we will take 
care of it.' He said, 'I have got to go and get to the 
airport. I will miss my plane." 
Sugar, on direct examination by his counsel, admitted 
such a call. He testified as follows: 
"Answer: Yes, Mr. Bushnell and Mr. Ulmer, I think, 
my memory is hazy on that. 
Question: At least you had a conversation with him 
about the fees, shortly after you came back to the office 
after your illness? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: Can you recall what the substance of that 
was? 
Answer: I don't recall. 
Question: Was a fee arrangement involved in the con-
versation in any way that you recall? 
Answer: No, it was something about the $500, but I 
don't recall the conversation. 
Question: And was Mr. Ulmer present at that time? 
Answer: I think so, either present or might have been 
three-way telephone conversation, or in the office. 
Truthfully, my memory is a little hazy on that." (R. 
41). 
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The foregoing testimony and admissions by the Appellants 
would appear sufficient to support the position of the Re-
spondent. However, in addition to those admissions, there is 
the direct testimony of Mr. Bushnell, based upon a written 
memorandum in his file, as follows: 
"That would be 1955. Mr. Sugar told me, 'Well, I will 
see what I can work out getting these properties, and 
we will have further discussions.' 
"Thereafter, I was advised by Mr. Ulmer that Mr. 
Sugar had become ill, and had gone to the hospital, 
and that he would take over working out these ar-
rangements; and I procured from Mr. Ulmer properties, 
abstracts, geological reports, maps-usual information 
that goes into offering circulars. 
"However, I advised Mr. Ulmer-and my thought-
best recollection on that-would be some few days 
before April 12, 1955; that, if they wanted me to re-
lease them from personal liability, that I would be 
willing to take this case, as I had other cases, on, in 
essence, a contingent fee basis. 
"I explained, many of these companies had never been 
successful, and it was problematical whether they 
would receive the money, and I had to work on per-
centage, that I would be willing to take the case on a 
fee of $3,000 cash and $3,000 worth of stock, and a 
$500 retainer, which would have to be paid in advance, 
plus costs. 
"If they paid the $500 retainer and costs, then I wo~d 
relieve them from personal liability, which I was claun-
ing as to the $1,250, and look to the company for pay-
ment if it were successful. 
"He said, 'Well, this is new to me; I will have to dis-
cuss it with Mr. Sugar, and I will let you know.' 
10 
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"A day or two later, he called back, and the exact 
date was April 12 at 3:50 in the afternoon, and advised 
that-and stated that he had talked to Mr. Sugar, and 
that the fee was satisfactory. With reference to that 
telephone conversation, which was taken by a stenog-
rapher in my office, I made the notation as to the fee 
which we discussed, which was $3,000 cash, $3,000 
stock, if the underwriting were successful, and a $500 
down payment as a retainer, plus costs, and filed that 
memorandum in the file." (R. 29). 
Having in mind the fundamental rule that, on appeal 
from factual issues, the evidence will be reviewed in the light 
most favorable to the Respondent and if there is any sub-
stantial competent evidence to support the finding of the trial 
court, such finding will be affirmed, it is submitted that the 
foregoing evidence is more than ample to justify on affirmance 
of the decision of the trial court on this factual issue. 
POINT TWO: THE OBLIGATION OF THE APPEL-
LANTS WAS NOT DISCHARGED BY VIRTUE OF TITLE 
15-4, U.C.A. 1953. 
The Appellants maintain that the claim of the Respondent 
is barred by reason of Title 15-4, U.C.A., 1953, which provides 
that if a joint obligor is released from liability and a reservation 
of rights against other joint obligors is not contained in that 
release, then all parties are released and discharged. The Re-
spondent does not argue with the law cited by the Appellants 
based upon that particular statutory provision. However, it is 
submitted that there was no release of a joint obligor which 
would bring into operation the terms of this statute. A release 
is a contract by the terms of which one party, for a good and 
11 
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valuable consideration, releases and discharges rights of another 
party. There is no document purporting to be a release, nor 
is there any agreement or consideration which would support 
such a contention. Rather, the only thing relied upon by the 
Appellants in support of their contention is the fact that the 
Respondent voluntarily reduced the amount of its claim against 
the corporation by $700. Counsel for the Appellants, also 
representing Deseret Uranium Corporation, had stipulated 
that the Respondent could secure judgment against the cor-
poration. At this time a decision by a City Judge in the identical 
matter now before this court was under advisement. Counsel 
for the Appellant was arguing that the securing of a judgment 
against the corporation for the full claim would prohibit the 
Respondent from securing a judgment against the Appellants 
for part of the same claim. To eliminate any substance to 
such a contention, and since the corporation was insolvent, the 
Respondent voluntarily reduced the amount of its requested 
claim by $700. Such a reduction does not amount to a contract 
or a release, and was not supported by a consideration. 
The annotation cited by the Appellants in their brief in 50 
A.L.R. 105 7 is entitled "Release of one tort-feasor as affecting 
liability of others." Although the annotation is dealing with 
release of tort feasors and the case now before the court is 
dealing with joint obligors pursuant to a contract, it is sub-
mitted that what amounts to a release would be the same in 
both cases. One of the subparagraphs of the annotation is as 
follows: "Dismissal or entry of nolle prosequi as to part." 
The general statement of the la\v under this subdivision is as 
follows: 
12 
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"The discontinuance, as to one tort-feasor, of an action 
brought against several tort-feasors, does not release 
the others." (Citation of authorities.) 
The annotation is supplemented in 66 A.L.R. 206, 104 
A.L.R. 846, 124 A.L.R. 1298, and 148 A.L.R. 1270. In each of 
the subsequent annotations the general rule is stated to the 
same effect. Excerpts from some of those supplemental anno-
tations are as follows: 
104 A.L.R. 860. 
"VI. Dismissal or entry of nolle prosequi as to part. 
(Supplementing annotations in 50 A.L.R. 1091 and 
66 A.L.R. 213). 
Neither a dismissal of a claim as against one or two 
joint tort-feasors, for conversion, nor even a settle-
ment made with one of them, was held to effect a 
release of another, in Day v. Smith ( 1934) 46 Wyo. 
515, 30 P. 2d 786. 
In overruling the contention that the trial court's dis-
missal of a suit, as to a defendant who had obtained 
a covenant not to sue, thereby gave the agreement the 
effect of a release so as to discharge another defendant, 
who did not appeal therefrom, the court in Cook v. 
City Transport Corp. ( 1935) 272 Mich. 91, 261 N.W. 
257, supra, IV., observed that plaintiff had a right to 
elect whom he would sue and to dismiss as to a de-
fendant, and that he could accept the court's ruling as 
the equivalent of a voluntary dismissal by himself, 
which would not have discharged the other defendant; 
and it also stated that the dismissal did not change the 
other defendant's liability." 
124 A.L.R. 1315. 
"VI. Dismissal or entry of nolle prosequi as to part. 
(Supplementing annotations in 50 A.L.R. 1091; 66 
A.L.R. 213; and 104 A.L.R. 860). 
13 
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The general rule appears to be, as shown by the earlier 
annotations, that the discontinuance, as to one tort-
feasor, of an action brought against several tort-feasors, 
does not release the others. 
In Shea v. San Bernardino ( 1936) 7 Cal. 2d 688, 62 
P. 2d 365, the court said: 'The discontinuance, as to 
one tort-feasor, of an action brought against several 
tort-feasors, no satisfaction having been received, does 
not release the others.' In that case plaintiff brought 
suit against a railway company and city, for damages 
sustained while driving over a rough railway crossing, 
and it was held that plaintiff's dismissal of the action 
as to the railway company did not release the city, 
where there was no showing that any satisfaction was 
received by plaintiff for the injury. 
Plaintiff's dismissal of the cause of action as to the 
two joint tort-feasors, effectuated by voluntarily ask-
ing the clerk to enter such dismissal, in pursuance of 
a settlement and covenant not to sue, was held not 
to release other joint tort-feasors, in Lewis V. Johnson, 
(1939) 12 Cal. 2d 558, 86 P. 2d 99, set out more fully 
supra, IV a, wherein the court distinguished between 
such a voluntary dismissal by clerk's entry,' which 
is presumed to be without prejudice to the bringing 
of another action, and a dismissal entered in open court 
pursuant to stipulation, which is ordinarily effective as 
a retraxit.' " 
If the Respondent in this case could have dismissed the 
entire action as against the corporation and the same would 
not have been construed as a release of any liability, it is sub-
mitted that the Respondent may, in its discretion, waive a 
part of the claim against the corporation. The quotations 
from the annotations clearly state that the plaintiff may dismiss 
as to one joint tort-feasor or may even grant a covenant not 
14 
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to sue, and such action does not amount to a release which 
will bar recovery against other joint tort-feasors. It is manifest, 
therefore, that a dismissal or a waiver against one joint tort-
feasor or joint obligor does not amount to a release of liability. 
The complete argument of the Appellants is based up the as-
sumption that there had been a release of liability by the 
Respondent. The evidence does not support such a contention. 
Even if it could be construed that a release had been granted, 
it is further submitted that the Appellants would be estopped 
to rely upon any benefits in their favor based thereon. The 
reduction in the amount of the claim against the corporation 
was made as a result of complaints and arguments then being 
made by the Appellants that the securing of a judgment against 
both the corporation and the individual appelfants would be 
tantamount to double payment. Although it is submitted that 
the securing of judgments without satisfaction is not double 
payment, it would still be inequitable for the appellants to 
now contend that the Respondent by voluntarily reducing the 
amount of his claim against the insolvent corporation has 
released the individual Appellants from any liability. 
The only case cited by the Appellant in support of its 
contention with reference to the release was a Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals case, Greenhalch vs. Shell Oil Company, 
78 F. 2d 942. This case involved a document entitled "Release 
and Stipulation for Dismissal." It was clear that the document 
was a release granted in payment of a substantial consideration, 
and further the document, after releasing and discharging the 
liability of the one party, specifically reserved rights as against 
a doctor for malpractice. It did not reserve its rights as against 
the defendant in the particular case. The court, therefore, 
15 
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held that the document was what it purported to be, a release 
and a stipulation for dismissal. In this case there was no con-
tract, payment of consideration, or document purporting or in-
tended to be a release or dismissal of any claims. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that there is substantial competent evidence 
to support the factual determination of the trial court that the 
Appellants individually agreed to pay a $500 retainer and costs. 
Further, it is submitted that there was no release granted to 
a co-obligor which would, therefore, bring into operation the 
terms of the statute cited by the Appellants. It is respectfully 
submitted that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed, 
with costs to the Respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH & BUSHNELL and 
ELWOOD A. CRANDALL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
By Elwood A. Crandall 
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NAUJOKS v. 
The following articles discuss recent 
trends in products liability cases~ 
21 NACCA Law J ourna 1 85, 419; 20 NACCA Law 
Journal 291; 4 Defense Journal 56; 2 Harper 
& James. The Law of Torts, page 1534 et seq~ 
and particularly page 1555 § 28.10 which 
clearly shows that any acts on the part of 
Suhrmann would not be considered an inter-
vening act breaking the proximate cause 
between defendants' negligence and breach 
of warranty and plaintiffs' injuries. 
FILED 
1 L11958 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
